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The low-cost multi-purpose multi-mission platform Elettra-Twin-Flyers (ETF) is being developed by the synergy of 
Nautilus S.p.A and the Politecnico di Torino1. It is a very innovative remotely-controlled airship equipped with high 
precision sensors and telecommunication devices. For its peculiar features, it is particularly suitable for inland, 
border and maritime surveillance missions and for telecommunication coverage extensions, especially in those areas 
which are either inaccessible or without conventional airport facilities and where the environmental impact is an 
essential concern. 
ETF is characterized by great maneuverability as well as low wind sensitivity2. Flight conditions range from 
forward, backward and sideward flight to hovering, both in normal and severe wind conditions. To achieve these 
capabilities the ETF has been conceived with a highly non conventional architecture based on a double hull with a 
central plane housing structure, propellers, on board energetic system and payload. The ETF command system 
mainly consists of two vertical rotational axis ducted propellers and four thrust-vectoring propellers mounted on 
rotating vertical arms. The ducted propellers provide the vertical thrust for steep rapid climb and descent and control 
the pitch attitude of the vehicle. In addition, their action is combined with the helium buoyancy to produce lift in 
hovering and forward flight, where the lift is also incremented by the aerodynamic component. The four thrust-
vectoring propellers control the lateral-directional attitude of the airship through the variation of the rotational speed 
(RPM) together with the rotation of the supporting vertical arms. 
Flight tests are in progress on a flight demonstrator3, which is a reduced-scale reduced-complexity platform, 
purposely assembled to test the most critical subsystems, such as the command system and the architectural solution.  
The system is also undergoing the European certification process, under the supervision of the Italian authority 
ENAC. According to ENAC, some of the scheduled flight tests are conditioned to specific permit to fly which 
should be issued upon the presentation of a safety analysis which should include a thorough risk assessment at the 
same strength of a conventional manned aircraft prototype. The airship, in fact, can be totally considered as an 
aircraft which has to accomplish a task. According to the Article 8 of the Chicago Convention4 held in 1944 to 
regulate the international civil aviation, an unmanned aerial vehicle may be regarded as an aircraft that can be 
engaged in aerial activities. Apart from the Chicago Convention, other principles of international law may apply to 
UAV, such as the Montreal Convention5 of 1971 and the Cape Town Convention6 of 2001. The criteria sanctioned 
in these conventions and the remarkable efforts of the newly established UAV Task Force have led to a draft 
document, containing the guideline principles for the development of a regulatory concept for the civil UAVs, in 
terms of Airworthiness & Certification, Security, Operation & Maintenance & Licensing, Air Traffic Management 
and Airports. Among these guideline principles, in particular, the “equivalence concept” states that ‘regulatory 
standards should be set to be no less demanding than those currently applied to comparable manned aircraft nor 
should they penalize UAV systems by requiring compliance with higher standard (…)’7. The assessment of the ETF 
reliability and safety has been hence accomplished in accordance with the aforementioned assumption. A report on 
the analysis is presented in [8] 
There are several standards, such as MIL-STD-8829, DO-178B10, IEC 61508 and 6151111, ARP475412, UK Def 
Stan 00-5613, which provide the guidelines to achieve this purpose and establish the essential preventive and 
alleviating safety measures that have to be adopted in order to not exceed the tolerable risk threshold. Whatever the 
standard is, before any quantitative analysis can be performed, it is usually necessary to carry out an accurate 
analysis of all the possible failures on all the subsystems and components, in order to undertake corrective actions in 
case the hazard occurrence probability (Hazard Probability) is too high for that particular severity level. The 
knowledge of the cause-and-effect relationships is essential to detect the root cause of a failure and evaluate the 
resulting chain of events. This step is called ‘Hazard Analysis’ and consists in an attempt to identify the potential 
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sources of danger for any human being of for the environment. In particular, for a novel and complex system, such 
as the new concept Nautilus airship, many hazards might rise from its innovative control system and other critical 
subsystems. To perform a reliable risk analysis all these hazards must be correctly identified, since the risks 
associated with unidentified hazards cannot be analyzed or reduced. This process is usually very time-consuming 
and performed ‘manually’ by a work team who has a deep knowledge of the system and try to speculate on every 
possible failure mode, component by component. Analyses such as FMEA14 (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) or 
Hazop, however, are based on an informal model of the system, and it is unlikely that these analyses will be 
complete, consistent, and error-free. Using precise formal models of the system as the basis of the analysis may help 
reduce errors and provide a more thorough analysis. The procedure of developing a hazard analysis from a formal 
model is called model-based safety analysis15-18 and is one of the new frontiers of the Reliability & Safety analysis.  
The main aim of this paper is to develop a procedure to perform a static analysis such as the FMEA, making use 
of a very detailed Flight Simulator19 implemented in Simulink mainly for design purposes. The main concept behind 
the idea, is that Simulink is a tool purposely design to perform dynamic analysis, but can be used as a static analysis 
infrastructure, provided the flow of information is correctly propagated through the blocks and blocks have been 
properly augmented with information about component failures. In this paper we propose an approach of model-
based safety analysis, in which the system and safety engineers use the same system models, extending the system 
model with failure information, as well as relevant portions of the physical system, in order to provide the safety 
analysis with automated support. 
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